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People enjoy having impact. Psychologists consider the impact incentive as
a major one (McClelland (1987), chapter 4). Having impact on the world
gives people pleasure as it makes them feel strong and excited (McClelland
et al. (1985), and Schultheiss et al. (2005)). The impact incentive appears
early in life. McClelland (1987, p. 148) quotes Levy (1955) about the ‘battle
of the spoon’:
“...the moment when the baby grabs the spoon from the mother’s
hand and tries to feed itself. ... We can be sure that the child
is not motivated at this point by increased oral gratiﬁcation. He
g e t sm o r ef o o db yl e t t i n gm o t h e rd oi t ,b u tb yd o i n gi th i m s e l fh e
gets more of another kind of satisfaction–a feeling of eﬃcacy.”
In older babies, the desire for impact can result in annoying and even dan-
gerous behavior, like making loud noises, knocking things about, or pulling
things oﬀ tables. Out of the impact experiences in early childhood, and the
gratiﬁcation that it brings, develops what McClelland (1987) describes as
the ‘power motive:’ a recurrent concern for having impact on others or the
world at large (see also Winter, 1973). The desire for impact also relates to
de Charms (1968)’s notion of ‘personal causation’ and to Deci (1975)’s con-
cept of self-determination. According to de Charms (1968, p. 269), “Man’s
primary motivational propensity is to be eﬀective in producing change in his
environment.” The impact motive also appears in the wonderful story Tom
Wolfe reports in The Right Stuﬀ about astronauts who demanded manual
controls on a spacecraft, rather than allowing automatic controls to control
the ﬂight.
This paper explores the meaning and implications of a person’s desire
for impact. The meaning is not obvious. Taking a particular action x may
well be considered as having the same impact as avoiding action x.W es h a l l
address this paradox. Our study focuses on how the impact motive aﬀects
behavior in the labor market. We will show that people’s desire for impact
can parsimoniously explain a wide range of phenomena observed in labor
markets, including wage dispersion, the prevalence of incomplete contracts,
the low wage returns to company training, and monopsony-like behavior in
seemingly non-monopsonistic labor markets.
E m p l o y e r sd e e mt h ei m p a c tm o t i v ea si m p o r t a n t . J o ba d ss o m e t i m e s
mention “desire to make an impact” as a qualiﬁcation of the ideal candidate.
1For instance, the accounting ﬁrm Deloitte UK states on its recruitment web-
site that one of the characteristics that their consultants have in common
is “a desire to make an impact and create change.”1 Trader Joe’s Grocery
Stores tries to recruit store workers by oﬀering the chance to “make an im-
pact on people, product, and sales. We’re talking about a chance to make a
diﬀerence, not just be another cog in the wheel.”2 Perry (2001, p. 28) quotes
a director of Xerox’s research center as saying that: “Our top stars say they
want to make an impact–that’s the most important thing. Feeling they are
c o n t r i b u t i n ga n dm a k i n gad i ﬀerence is highly motivational for them.” Sim-
ilarly, a director of human resources of technology company Corning says:
“People come to work here because they want to do world-changing things.
If for some reason they think they can’t do that, they may look elsewhere.”
A report by the British Treasury (Foster et al., (2002), p. 6) quotes a senior
manager of a University Hospital as saying that: “...being able to have a real
impact on how the patients are treated is key. There are quite phenomenal
returns in terms of motivation.” In the same report (p. 11), a manager of
Stockton Council says: “It is about the public service, but it is also about
having the opportunity to make a diﬀerence ... It is more than wanting to
do good. It is about knowing that you actually do make a real diﬀerence.”
Our assumption that a worker cares about his impact relates to the as-
sumption that a worker values the output he produces. The two diﬀer, how-
ever, because a person can also make a diﬀerence by producing less than
someone else would. Also, the impact motive is not limited to the produc-
tion of public services or ‘doing good.’ Several recent papers study workers
who care about output, either for altruistic reasons (Francois (2000, 2004),
and Prendergast (2003)) or because they intrinsically value their contribution
to the production of public services (Besley and Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw
and Dur (2004), and Glazer (2004)).
An extensive literature in psychology, both theoretical and empirical,
stresses the importance of the impact motive for workers’ behavior. Hackman
and Oldham (1976) identify task signiﬁcance (that is, the degree to which
the task is seen as important and having impact) as one of the ﬁve core job
dimensions promoting performance quality and job satisfaction. Relatedly,
in Thomas and Velthouse (1990)’s concept of ‘worker empowerment,’ sense
of impact is one of the four core dimensions fostering intrinsic task motiva-
1http://graduates.deloitte.co.uk/index.cfm?p_id=242
2http://company.monster.com/trader/
2tion (see also Conger and Kanungo, 1988). Spreitzer and Doneson (2005)
review extensive empirical evidence showing that employees are higher per-
forming and have more positive attitudes in terms of work satisfaction when
given more power. Relatedly, much evidence indicates that people intrinsi-
cally value freedom of choice beyond the mere opportunity to match personal
preferences with available alternatives (see, for example, Deci (1975), Perl-
mutter and Monty (1977), and Zuckerman et al. (1978)).3
Economists have also found evidence consistent with the idea that impact
matters to workers. In a recent survey among US nonproﬁtw o r k e r s ,6 1 %s a y
t h a tt h ec h a n c et om a k ead i ﬀerence is more important to them than the
salary and beneﬁts (Light (2002)). In a more direct study of the relation
between impact and wages, Handel (2000) examined 1,311 responses to the
Quality of Employment Survey of 1977. He ﬁnds that 18.1% of respondents
were willing to trade a 10 percent pay raise in return for “more freedom to
decide how to work.” Benz and Frey (2003) examine why, though employees
earn more than the self-employed, self-employed workers are happier than
employed workers. Using survey data from 23 countries, they ﬁnd after care-
fully controlling for many diﬀerent inﬂuences that the greater autonomy of
self-employed people fully explains the positive job satisfaction diﬀerential
between self-employed and employed people (see also Frey and Benz (2003)).
Frey and Kucher (1999), using survey data on Swiss managers, ﬁnd that hav-
ing more subordinates does not signiﬁcantly increase the wage after control-
ling for manager’s education, tenure, and several other characteristics. They
interpret this ﬁnding as evidence that people are willing to pay for power.
Frey et al. (2001) study earnings of Swiss public employees in 1996, and
ﬁnd that earnings of higher-ranked public employees are higher in cantons
having more direct democracy, indicating a compensating wage diﬀerential
for less discretionary leeway. Smith, Masi, and Lemay (1997) ﬁnd evidence
for the impact motive from market data: the greater a worker’s autonomy in
decision making, the lower his pay.4
3Freedom of choice may, however, also cause a psychological burden, in particular when
choices are complex, or when people must choose among unwanted outcomes. See Botti
and Iyengar (2004), and the papers discussed therein.
4We note, however, that the evidence on how a worker’s wage varies with how closely
he is supervised is mixed. (See, for example, Leonard (1987), Groshen and Krueger (1990),
Krueger (1991), and Brunello (1995)). While the desire by workers for impact implies a
positive relation between wages and supervision, standard eﬃciency wage theory suggests
a negative relation between wages and supervision. (See, however, Walsh (1999), who
3In the following, we shall suppose that a person’s utility increases with
his income and with his impact. As noted above, identifying impact can be
problematic: if action x increases output, then not taking action x reduces
output, and so taking action x and avoiding action x may be seen as hav-
ing the same impact. We address this paradox by supposing that a person
measures the impact of any action he may take by comparing output in the
current period to what it would have been had he unexpectedly ceased to
exist an instant before. Thus, we deﬁne a person’s impact as the diﬀerence
that his existence makes to output. Note that impact can arise both because
a person increases output, and because he reduces it. We allow for both.
2M o n o p s o n y - l i k e b e h a v i o r
For our ﬁrst application, consider a ﬁrm producing goods using capital (K)
and labor (L) as inputs. For simplicity, let eﬀort by each worker be exoge-
nously given, so that L represents the number of workers hired. Output is
Q = f(K,L),w i t hfL > 0 and fK > 0. Suppose, as is conventional, that
fLL < 0 and fKK < 0, or that the marginal product of labor declines with
the number of workers the ﬁrm hires, and similarly for capital. Output is
sold at price p; the rental rate of capital is r.
A person’s utility, U(w,I), increases with his income w and with his im-
pact I. W ea s s u m et h a taw o r k e r ’ so u t s i d eo p t i o ni su n e m p l o y m e n t . A n
unemployed person gets an unemployment beneﬁt b, and engages in house-
hold production with monetary value q, implying income w = b + q.( W e
could instead assume that the worker’s outside option is self-employment,
resulting in production value q,a n db =0 ).
Following our deﬁnition of impact, when a worker chooses the outside
option, his impact is q, since output declines by q when the worker ceases
to exist. A worker’s impact when working for a ﬁrm depends on the ease
with which the ﬁrm can replace a worker. If a worker cannot be replaced,
and the capital stock is ﬁxed, then his impact equals the value of his mar-
ginal product pfL(K,L). If a worker can be replaced immediately by an
unemployed person, then the ﬁrm’s output remains the same when a worker
vanishes. Aggregate output in the economy, however, falls by q,s i n c et h e
worker’s substitute no longer engages in household production. Hence, when
shows that the sign of the eﬃciency-wage eﬀect depends on the shape of the worker’s
eﬀort supply curve.)
4a worker can be replaced immediately, an employed person’s impact equals
an unemployed person’s impact, q. More generally, suppose that with prob-
ability φ a ﬁrm can immediately replace a worker. Assume that, because of
search frictions in the labor market, φ<1.5 An employed worker’s impact
is then
I(K,L)=( 1− φ)pfL(K,L)+φq, (1)
with ﬁrst derivatives:
IK =( 1 − φ)pfLK ≥ 0,
IL =( 1 − φ)pfLL < 0.
When the ﬁrm hires more labor, the marginal product of labor declines, and
so each worker’s impact, I, declines. Unless capital and labor are perfect
substitutes (fLK =0 ), an increase in the capital stock increases each worker’s
impact.
When hiring labor, the ﬁrm must satisfy a worker’s participation con-
















Hence, a ﬁrm which hires additional labor will ﬁnd that each worker’s utility
from impact declines, so that it must compensate with a higher wage. When
the ﬁrm installs more capital, and fLK > 0, each worker’s impact increases,
and so the ﬁrm can oﬀer a lower wage.6
The ﬁrm chooses K, L,a n dw to maximize proﬁts, pf(K,L)−rK −wL,
subject to U [w,I(K,L)] > U (w,q).T h e ﬁrst-order condition for optimal
employment is:
pfL(K,L) − w − wLL =0 . (2)
5Using data from a survey of 800 managers in 12 industries in the United States,
Nicholson et al. (2004) ﬁnd that only 22% of the workers are easy to replace with a worker
of similar quality or productivity. A 3-day absence has no eﬀect on output for only 29%
of workers, whereas a 2-week absence aﬀects output for all but 15% of the workers.
6This does not necessarily imply that more capital-intensive ﬁrms pay lower wages.
Indeed, in empirical work Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Hellerstein and
Neumark (1999) ﬁnd the opposite. Depending on the exact properties of the production
function, more capital-intensive ﬁrms may pay higher or lower wages in the optimum.
5Since wL > 0,t h eﬁr mw i l lh i r el e s sl a b o rt h a na tt h ep o i n tw h e r et h ew a g e
equals the marginal product of labor. For by hiring more labor, it increases
t h ew a g ei tm u s tp a y .T h u s ,t h ed e s i r eb yw o r k e r sf o ri m p a c th a si m p l i c a t i o n s
similar to monopsony.
A standard result in the monopsony literature, is that when ﬁrms have
monopsony power over heterogeneous workers, the imposition of a minimum
wage can increase employment. That result also holds in our model.7 This
relates to the ﬁnding by Card and Krueger (1994) that an increase in the
minimum wage in New Jersey in 1992 did not reduce employment in fast-
food restaurants. One explanation oﬀered was monopsony. But it is unclear
why fast-food restaurants in New Jersey enjoyed any monopsony power. As
is clear from the above results, a minimum wage may increase employment
even when workers are identical and ﬁrms lack monopsony power. All that is
necessary is that workers value impact, and cannot be replaced immediately
when they quit the ﬁrm or vanish.
Another immediate implication of our model is that the impact motive
may lead workers with the same characteristics but at ﬁrms with diﬀerent
production technologies to earn diﬀerent wages. When workers do not care
about impact, the wage w simply equals the reservation wage w,a n di s
thus independent of the characteristics of the industry or of the ﬁrm. When
workers do care about impact, the wage depends on worker’s impact in the
optimum, which diﬀers according to the properties of the production func-
tion.
Workers’ desire to make an impact also aﬀects ﬁrm’s choice of the amount
of capital it installs. Given the number of workers, the ﬁrm’s optimal capital
stock is implicitly described by
pfK(K,L) − r − wKL =0 . (3)
If fLK > 0,t h e nwK < 0, and hence the workers’ desire for impact increases
the ﬁrm’s optimal capital stock. A higher capital stock reduces wage cost
as all workers ﬁnd their job more meaningful. Hence, the return to capital
will be lower than the market interest rate, and the more so in sectors where
capital and labor are more complementary; only when capital and labor are
perfect substitutes does optimal investment have the return to capital equal
7As in the standard monopsony model, imposing a minimum wage which is higher than
the wage w but lower than w + wLL increases employment. Imposing a minimum wage
higher than w + wLL decreases employment.
6the market interest rate.8
Our results will continue to hold when the ﬁrm has monopoly power in
the product market. Then, even for a given physical marginal product of
l a b o r ,t h ew o r k e r ’ sw a g ei n c r e a s e sw i t hﬁrm’s output: the downward sloping
demand curve means that the value of marginal product declines with output
even if physical marginal product does not decline as the ﬁrm expands output.
Hence, if the ﬁrm has some monopoly power in the product market, workers’
wage increases with the number of workers hired, even when fLL =0 .
3 Propagation of unemployment shocks
A ﬁrm can more easily replace workers the looser the labor market. The lit-
erature on job search commonly assumes that the probability that a vacancy
is ﬁlled increases with the unemployment rate (see for instance Pissarides
(2000)). In our model, this implies that φ increases with the economy’s un-









where Iφ = −[pfL(K,L) − q] < 0, as seen from (1). A rise in unemployment
makes it easier for a ﬁrm to replace a worker, implying a decline in worker’s
impact. As the job has become less attractive compared to the outside option
of unemployment, the wage must rise. This, in turn, induces the ﬁrm to lay
oﬀ some workers. Similarly, a shock which reduces demand for the ﬁrm’s
product reduces each worker’s value of marginal product for any given level of
employment. As the utility from employment has declined, the wage a person
will demand to accept the job will increase, thereby reducing employment.
Worker’s desire for impact thus supports high wages during recessions, and
may therefore deepen recessions. The opposite holds when the economy
booms.
Clearly, in practice as well as in a more elaborate model, workers may
be willing to accept wage cuts during recessions, for instance when employed
8Stronger substitutability of capital and labor may also reduce in another way a worker’s
impact. When the ﬁrm fails to hire a new worker after the current worker vanishes, it may
install additional capital, which increases production more, the closer capital and labor
are substitutes.
7workers earn a rent and a wage cut reduces the probability of job losses.
Then, the impact motive reduces workers’ willingness to accept wage cuts,
and may therefore contribute to wage stickiness.
4 Investment in worker’s skills and hold-up
We saw that if capital is complementary with labor, a ﬁrm can reduce the
wage it pays by investing in more capital. Clearly, the same holds for invest-
ment in worker’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, as such investment directly increases a
worker’s marginal product when working for the ﬁrm. The impact motive
may thus alleviate the well-known hold-up problem which may arise when
wages may be renegotiated after the investment has been made. (See Mal-
comson (1997) for a survey of the hold-up literature.)
Consider the following example. A ﬁrm employs one worker whose pro-
ductivity is given by R(S),w h e r eS is ﬁrm’s investment in worker’s ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are R(S)−w −S. Hence, for a given wage,
the ﬁrm’s optimal investment satisﬁes RS(S)=1 .T h a ti s ,t h eﬁrm invests
up to the point where the last dollar invested yields a return of a dollar. This
level of investment would arise in the absence of both the hold-up problem
and the impact motive.
Suppose that after a ﬁrm invested, the ﬁrm and the worker can renegotiate
the wage, resulting in the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The ﬁrm’s
surplus is:
R(S) − w − φ[R(So) − wo − So],
where, as before, φ is the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, So is the investment
in a new employee’s skills, and wo is the wage paid a new employee. Note that
S does not appear as a cost, since it is a sunk cost once the investment has
been made. For convenience, let a worker’s utility be linear in income and
impact, with γ measuring the weight on impact. A worker’s surplus from
working rather than taking the outside option is the diﬀerence in income,
w−w,p l u sγ times the diﬀerence in impact. A worker’s impact when working
at the ﬁrm equals (1 − φ)R(S)+φ[R(S) − R(So)+q].T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence
from (1) is that a new worker’s productivity can diﬀer from the current
worker’s productivity, since S n e e dn o tb ee q u a lt oSo.9 Worker’s impact in
9If the investment in a new worker’s skills So is also considered as output, the current
worker’s impact is φSo higher. Including this does not aﬀect the results, except for the
8the outside option is q, as in Section 2. The worker’s surplus is therefore
w − w + γ {R(S) − φR(So) − (1 − φ)q}. (4)
The Nash bargaining solution implies:
w = α{R(S) − φ[R(So) − wo − So]} + (5)
(1 − α){w − γ [R(S) − φR(So) − (1 − φ)q]},
where α is the worker’s relative bargaining power. The worker’s wage result-
ing from the bargaining clearly depends on the ﬁrm’s investment S:
∂w
∂S
= αRS(S) − (1 − α)γRS(S).
As in the standard hold-up model, the wage increases with S,t h ew o r k e r
capturing part of the return on investment; see the ﬁrst term. For a given So,
however, the worker’s impact also increases with S, resulting in an increase
in the worker’s surplus and, hence, a lower wage; see the second term. If
t h ei m p a c tm o t i v ei ss u ﬃciently strong compared to a worker’s bargaining
power (that is, if γ>α / (1 − α)), the bargained wage declines with the
ﬁrm’s investment. This contrasts to the standard hold-up model without the
impact motive.
The ﬁrm anticipates renegotiation of the wage when deciding how much
to invest on the worker. Maximizing proﬁts R(S) − w − S with respect to





As in the standard hold-up model, the worker’s ex post bargaining power
(α>0) reduces the ﬁrm’s optimal investment, because the ﬁrm anticipates
that it does not reap the full return on its investment. But the worker’s
desire for impact (γ>0) increases the ﬁrm’s investment: an increase in the
worker’s skills increases the worker’s impact, reducing the wage that results
from bargaining. When γ = α/(1 − α),t h et w oe ﬀects cancel and optimal
equilibrium wage in equation (7), which is γSo higher.
9investment satisﬁes RS(S)=1 .W h e n γ is larger, the ﬁrm invests even
more.10
The eﬀect of the impact motive on optimal investment is independent
of the value of φ. So, even when the worker can be replaced immediately
(φ =1 ), worker’s desire for impact promotes ﬁrm’s investment in worker’s
skills. Inspection of the expression for worker’s surplus (4) shows why. When
the ﬁrm increases S, the worker’s impact increases for a given value of So,
independent of the ease with which the worker can be replaced. The higher
impact implies a higher surplus to the worker, resulting in a lower negotiated
wage. Because the ﬁrm’s investment in its current worker’s skills does not
aﬀect the proﬁtability of investing in a new worker’s skills were the current
worker to vanish, So is taken as given. In equilibrium, of course, S = So and




(α[(1 − φ)R(S)+φS]+( 1− α){w − γ (1 − φ)[R(S) − q]})
As opposed to the ﬁrm’s incentives to invest, the equilibrium wage does
depend on φ. The ease with which a worker can be replaced has two eﬀects.
First, a higher φ improves the outside option of the ﬁrm, implying a lower
bargained wage. Second, a higher φ reduces a worker’s impact, implying a
higher bargained wage. Only when γ is suﬃciently large does the impact
eﬀect dominate.
Consider the extreme cases φ =0(a worker is never replaced) and φ =1
(a worker is immediately replaced). When φ =0the equilibrium wage is
w = αR(S)+( 1− α){w − γ [R(S) − q]},
which increases with S when γ<α / (1 − α); this is identical to the condi-
tion for RS(S) > 1 we obtained before. When the worker can be replaced
immediately (φ =1 ), the equilibrium wage is




10The high wage returns to private-sector training usually found in empirical studies may
suggest that the impact motive plays only a minor role in investment decisions. However,
a recent study by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2003) shows that a large part of the estimated
returns can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity. Controlling for the selectivity bias
reduces the point estimate of the return to training from 12.5% to 0.6%. Low or zero
returns to company training are also found by Goux and Maurin (2000), Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2004), and Pischke (2001).
10which always increases with S, but is independent of the return on investment
and also independent of the worker’s desire for impact as measured by γ.T h e
intuition is straightforward. The equilibrium wage increases with equilibrium
investment since, when the worker would leave, the ﬁrm hires a new worker
and incurs investment cost S. The current worker captures part of this
quasi-rent. Since a worker can be replaced immediately, his impact is the
same inside and outside the ﬁrm, and equals q, as in Section 2. Hence, in
equilibrium, the worker derives no utility from impact, and so impact does
not aﬀect the wage. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the worker’s desire for
impact raises the ﬁrm’s investment in worker’s skills, independent of the value
of φ; see (6). Hence, RS(S) may be less than 1, implying high investment
in worker’s skills, even when the worker captures much of the (quasi-)rents
from the ﬁrm’s investment. If the ﬁrm could commit to investment in future
worker’s skills, it would commit to little investment, aiming to increase the
c u r r e n tw o r k e r ’ si m p a c ta n dh e n c er e d u c et h ew a g ei tp a y st h ec u r r e n tw o r k e r .
5E ﬀort and incentive pay
We so far assumed that a worker’s eﬀort is exogenously ﬁxed. In this sec-
tion, we relax this assumption and examine the implications of the impact
motive for optimal incentive schemes and worker’s eﬀort. As in the previ-
ous section, we consider a ﬁrm which employs a single worker whose utility
is linear in income and impact. For simplicity, let a worker’s cost of eﬀort
be 1
2θe2.E ﬀort e generates output e,s o l da tu n i tp r i c ep.T o s a v e s p a c e ,
we abstract from household production (q =0 ). As before, we assume that
workers are homogeneous. We distinguish two cases: noncontractible eﬀort
and contractible eﬀort.11
5.1 Noncontractible eﬀort
When eﬀort is noncontractible, the ﬁrm’s only choice variable is the wage of-
fer. The optimal wage oﬀer is such that the worker’s participation constraint
is just met, as in Section 3. The worker chooses eﬀort. The worker’s impact
11Note that, since output is deterministic in our model, we assume that, in the latter
case, both eﬀort and output are contractible, whereas in the former case neither eﬀort nor
output is contractible.
11is:
I(e)=( 1− φ)pe + φ|pe − Epeo|,
where Eeo is the expected level of eﬀort by the replacement worker. With
probability (1 − φ), the worker is not replaced and his impact equals the value
of his production. With the remaining probability, the worker is replaced, and
his impact equals the expected absolute diﬀerence between his production








− θe =0 ,
where e 6= Eeo.N o t e t h a t w h e n φ =0 ,o p t i m a le ﬀort is e =
γ
θp. Hence,
though the ﬁrm does not reward the worker for eﬀort, the worker optimally
chooses positive eﬀort, as it increases his utility from impact. For any φ>0,









γ (1 − 2φ)
θ
p.
Suppose ﬁrst that φ ≤ 1/2, so that both local maxima imply positive eﬀort.
Clearly, we cannot have a unique value of optimal eﬀort. If one of the eﬀort
levels would be strictly optimal for the current worker, it will also be for
the worker who would replace him, reducing a worker’s impact to zero, and
violating the requirement that e 6= Eeo.I n s t e a d ,w o r k e r sm i xo ne∗
h and e∗
l.
F o rt h i s ,t h ew o r k e rm u s tb ei n d i ﬀerent between choosing high eﬀort and low
eﬀort. That is,










w + γ [(1 − φ)pe
∗








Let z be the probability with which the replacing worker exerts e∗
h.C o n s e -
quently:





Substituting this and the values of e∗
h and e∗
l into (8) yields
z =1 /2.
12Hence, workers mix with equal probability on e∗
h and e∗
l. Similarly, it follows
that when φ>1/2,a n ds oe∗







and with the remaining probability exerts no eﬀort.
The wage the ﬁrm must oﬀer follows from the worker’s participation con-
straint U ≥ U:
if φ ≤ 1/2 then w = U −
1
2
[1 − 2φ(1 − φ)]p2γ2
θ





Clearly, the wage decreases with how much workers care about impact (γ)
and increases with the cost of eﬀort (θ) and the outside option utility (U).
For 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
2, the wage increases with the replacement probability (φ), as
higher replacement implies less opportunity to make an impact. A higher
price of the product implies greater impact at given eﬀort and so reduces the
wage.
5.2 Contractible eﬀort
When eﬀort is contractible, the ﬁrm can avoid inducing workers to mix on
high and low eﬀort by oﬀering a contract that ﬁxes eﬀort. Then, however, a
worker’s utility from impact falls, and so the ﬁrm must pay a higher wage.
This section examines this trade-oﬀ by comparing expected proﬁts under two
alternative contracts: one that ﬁxes eﬀo r ta n do n et h a to ﬀers a piece rate.
Consider ﬁrst the ﬁxed-eﬀort contract. The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts pe−w
subject to the worker’s participation constraint:





Obviously, when the ﬁrm oﬀers a ﬁxed-eﬀort contract, the worker’s existence
only aﬀects output if the worker is not replaced, which happens with proba-
bility φ.T h ep r o ﬁt-maximizing eﬀort level is:
e
∗ =
1+γ (1 − φ)
θ
p, (9)
13which increases with the weight attached to impact γ and the product’s price
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2 − U.
Consider next a piece-rate contract paying a bonus of αp per unit of
output and a base salary of β. When choosing eﬀort, the worker’s utility is:














α + γ (1 − 2φ)
θ
p. (10)
As under noncontractible eﬀort, workers mix with equal probability on e∗
h
and e∗
















Maximizing with respect to α and β, subject to the worker’s participation
constraint U = U, yields optimal α =1 . Hence, as in a standard principal-
agent model with risk-neutral agents, the ﬁrm pays the full marginal product.
Note that this implies that the expected level of eﬀort is the same under

















It is easy to verify that if γ>0 and φ>0, then a piece-rate contract always
yields higher expected proﬁts than does a ﬁxed-eﬀort contract (Eπpr >π fe).
Hence, the ﬁrm proﬁts from giving the worker some autonomy. This result
holds also in the absence of search frictions in the labor market (φ =1 ).
12As we will see, if γ<1 the restriction that α+γ (1 − 2φ) > 0 for positive e∗
l does not
bind. That is, the marginal utility from impact must be smaller than the marginal utility
from consumption, which seems reasonable. If γ>1, workers mix on exerting eﬀort e∗
h
and exerting no eﬀort, as in the previous subsection.
14The intuition follows. A ﬁxed-eﬀort contract limits worker’s opportunity to
make an impact since a worker’s successor will exert the same eﬀo r ta st h e
current worker. A piece-rate contract leaves eﬀort choice to the worker. The
w o r k e rm i x e so nah i g ha n dal o we ﬀort level, resulting in the same expected
eﬀort level. Worker’s utility is higher, however, as his expected impact is
larger. The ﬁrm can therefore oﬀer a lower wage by not specifying eﬀort, but
instead giving the worker some autonomy.13 This is in line with the evidence
discussed in the Introduction that workers are willing to accept a lower wage
for greater autonomy (Smith et al. (1997), Frey et al. (2001), and Benz and
Frey (2003)). Desire by workers for impact may thus explain why ﬁrms leave
employment contracts deliberately incomplete.14
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Our model considered the desire of workers for impact, ignoring the same
desire by managers or entrepreneurs. This motive is a theme in one of the
most popular TV shows in the U.S., ‘The Apprentice.’ In the show, a wealthy
businessman, Donald Trump, ﬁres a worker each week. The pleasure he takes
in saying “You’re ﬁred” is evident. And, in line with our model, he also gets
t h ep l e a s u r eo fh i r i n go n ep e r s o na tt h ee n do ft h es h o w ,a n dh ec l e a r l y
l i k e st h ei m p a c th et h e nh a s . T r u m pe v e ne n j o y sﬁring high productivity
contestants.
Such an impact motive exhibited by managers may explain several styl-
ized facts. First, employer’s desire for impact may imply a bias towards ex-
panding the ﬁrm. This may happen when, with positive probability, the ﬁrm
vanishes once the employer vanishes. Second, when the employer is replaced
with positive probability, employers may mix on expanding and contracting
the ﬁrm. For by doing so, the employer minimizes the probability that a
successor will behave identically, and hence his existence matters for output.
Employers have more opportunities to make an impact in more rigid labor
markets. The reason is that laying oﬀ workers hardly aﬀects the economy’s
output in very ﬂexible labor markets as laid-oﬀ workers easily ﬁnd a new
job. So we may expect more volatile and higher unemployment in more rigid
13Note the diﬀerence with Aghion and Tirole (1997) where authority is valued by a
worker as it allows him to make his preferred choice.
14See Fehr et al. (2001) for an alternative explanation based on the theory of inequity
aversion.
15labor markets.
Another extension of the model would be to allow for heterogeneity in
desire for impact among people. As McClelland (1987, p. 173) notes, “While
all children start out enjoying having impact, some parents may strongly
discourage this activity, so their child does not develop much pleasure from
it or develop a good concept of how to attain pleasure in this way. Other
parents may allow or even encourage the activity, so their child develops
a more elaborate schematic representation of the many diﬀerent ways in
which he or she can get pleasure from having impact.” Allowing for such
heterogeneity may raise interesting issues of sorting by workers and selection
by employers.
We have deﬁned impact as the immediate eﬀect that a person’s existence
has on output. Clearly, there are other, possibly complementary concepts.
In addition to the ‘ﬂow’-approach we have pursued in this paper, one could
think of a person’s ‘stock’ of impact, that is, the eﬀe c tt h a th i sl i f eh a sh a do n
output. People may value knowing that the world would be a diﬀerent place
if they had never been born. Part of our results will also hold under this
deﬁnition of impact. Others may not. Lastly, one might revise the deﬁnition
of impact to the eﬀect a person has on other people’s lives, rather than on
output.
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